Risk-based capital requirements and loan growth by Elizabeth Laderman
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
Number 94-35, October 14, 1994
Risk-Based Capital Requirements
and Loan Growth
When the new risk-based capital-to-asset ratio
requirements for U.S. banks were announced in
early 1989, some banks and bank holding com-
panies (BHCs) found themselves undercapital-
ized. A number ofthese institutions met the new
requirements by decreasing their risky assets, in-
cluding loans. This has led some observers to
argue that the new standards contributed to the
slowdown in bank loan growth in the early 1990s.
Furlong (1992) and others have found evidence to
support this view.
But, slower loan growth is not the inevitable
consequence of tighter capital standards: Banks
could have met the new requirements by issuing
additional new capital. The question is: Why
didn't many of them? In this Weekly Letter, I
consider the negative wealth effect of common
stock issuance as one possible incentive for un-
dercapitalized BHCs to choose to decrease loan
growth rather than issue capital, and discuss
whether this incentive was important enough
to playa determining role in banks' lending
behavior.
Risk-based capiial requiremenis
Risk-based capital requirements for banks and
BHCs were announced in 1989 and phased in
over a period ending in December 1992. The
new risk-weighted asset portfolio was calculated
by applying different weights to different types
of assets, according to their perceived riskiness.
For example, commercial loans received the
highest weight and u.s. government securities
the lowest.
The risk-based capital requirements specify that
banks hold certain proportions of certain types
of capital. Banks and BHes now have to hold at
least 4 percent of their risk-weighted assets in so-
called Tier 1 capital and 8 percent oftheir risk-
weighted assets in Tier 1 plus supplementary
(Tier 2) capital. For BHCs, the bulk of Tier 1 cap-
ital must be common shareholders' equity plus
retained earnings, while Tier 2 capital includes
some types of preferred stock, mandatory con-
vertible debt, and subordinated debt. In addition
to the new risk-based requirements, banks and
BHCs must meet an effective new 4 percent
minimum ratio ofTier 1 capital to unweighted
assets (leverage ratio).
Wealth effects of common stock issuance
The separate requirements for Tier 1 capital
meant that some BHCs were potentially deficient
in common shareholders' equity but not neces-
sarily in other types of capital. It has been well-
established that, for a variety of types of firms, an
announcement of the intention to issue common
stock tends to decrease a firm's stock value. How-
ever, the announcement ofthe issuance of most
other types of securities does not tend to affect
stock value, although a few studies also find such
negative wealth effects for convertible debt, debt
that can be converted into stock.
One explanation for these findings is that man-
agers of firms have an incentive to issue equity
(common stock) when the firm's stock is over-
valued and straight debt (debt that cannot be
converted into common stock) when its stock is
undervalued. This is because when a firm issues
equity, it sells a portion of its existing assets but
acquires, for its existing stockholders, a share in
the value ofthe new project to be undertaken
with the funds raised. If the firm's existing assets
are significantly undervalued by the market, the
dilution suffered by existing stockholders can be
greater than any gains they receive from under-
taking the new project, in which case managers
would opt to issue debt rather than equity. On
the other hand, if a stock is overvalued, stock is-
suance rather than debt issuance begins to look
more beneficial to stockholders. The market re-
alizes that managers have these incentives. If
managers have inside information regarding the
value of the firm that market participants do not
have, then the issuance of equity will impart new
information to market participants. In particular,
investors, knowing managers' incentives, will in-
terpret the issuance of new equity as a signal that
the stock is overvalued, and the price will fall.FABSF
In contrast, investors will interpret the issuance
of new debt as a signal that the stock is under-
valued, and the price will rise.
This explanation, however, does not accord with
the empirical findings indicating the general lack
of any wealth effect, positive or negative, from
the issuance of straight debt. One explanation is
that market participants think that if a firm seeks
external financing by issuing stock or debt, it
must be expecting lower earnings. This is be-
cause, usually, financing through the retention of
earnings is less expensive than financing through
issuing securities. Thus, under this explanation,
issuance of debt also might be a signal that a
firm's stock price is "too high."
A synthesis of these two theories would say that
an equity issuance announcement would have a
negative effect, while a debt issuance announce-
ment would have an ambiguous effect on stock
returns.
Evidence for banks
Several studies indicate that, in the past, banking
organizations experienced negative wealth ef-
fects in connection with their common stock is-
suances. However, some have argued that this ef-
fect may have diminished or disappeared in the
early 1990s, with the phasing in of risk-based
capital requirements. The reason is that market
participants who observe a bank issuing new eq-
uity in a tighter regulatory environment may not
conclude that the bank's managers think the
stock is overvalued. Instead, they may think that
the bank simply is under regulatory pressure to
raise capital.
But this reasoning overlooks a capital deficient
bank's option to decrease asset growth relative to
the growth in capital achieved through retained
earnings. Thus, by issuing new equity instead of
reducing asset growth, a bank may still signal
that its stock is overvalued.
To investigate vvhethei the negative vvealth effect of
common stock issuance may still have been at
work among banks in the early 1990s, I looked
at the stock market's response to BHCs' announce-
ments of upcoming common stock issuances
during the period. I found that, on average, a
BHC's announcement of an impending issuance
of new common stock decreases its common
stock returns by about 1.6 percentage points (see
Laderman 1994). The size ofthis effect is very
similar to what others have found for other types
of firms and for BHCs in earlier periods. In con-
trast, I found that announcements concerning the
issuance of other types of securities that are in-
cluded in Tier 2 capital do not decrease stock
returns.
Consequences for loan growth
If BHCs witness a decrease in the value of their
outstanding stock when they announce that they
will issue new stock, then they may avoid issuing
new stock unless they have sufficiently attractive
lending opportunities. Therefore, BHCs trying to
raise their risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratios or
leverage ratios to meet the regulatory minima may
have strongly favored decreasing asset growth
over issuing new common stock. On the other
hand, if the stock price impact is a decisive fac-
tor, BHCs that could meet the requirements by
issuing Tier 2 capital (given their asset size)
might not have had as strong an incentive to
decrease asset growth.
Of particular interest is the effect that the new
risk-based capital requirements might have had
on loan growth. Among all bank assets, commer-
cial and consumer loans receive the highest risk
weight. Therefore, a reduction in loan growth will
decrease growth in risk-weighted assets more
than will reductions in growth in other types of
assets, like government securities. For this rea-
son, we might expect loan growth to have been
particularly affected by the new capital require-
ments. In addition, we want to examine loan
growth because of its potential to affect eco-
nomic growth generally.
To investigate whether the negative effect of
common stock issuance might have resulted in
reduced loan growth, I compared loan growth
across three groups of BHCs (Laderman 1994).
The first group, "unaffected" BHCs, included
those with enough of the various types of capital
in December 1990 that they already met all three
capital ratio minima that were due to be fully
phased in in December 1992. The second group,
"Tiei 2 deficient" BHes, included those with
the choice of issuing either Tier 1 capital (com-
mon stock) or Tier 2 capital or decreasing asset
growth. The third group, "Tier 1 deficient" BHCs,
either had to issue new common stock or de-
crease asset growth.
The difference in average loan growth rates be-
tween unaffected and Tier 2 deficient BHCs on
the one hand and Tier 1 deficient SHCs on the
other hand was striking. Unaffected and Tier 2deficient BHCs both showed positive average
loan growth between December 1990 and De-
cember 1992, and the loan growth rates were
similar: 10.3 percent for unaffected BHCs and
11.5 percent for Tier 2 deficientBHCs. In sharp
contrast, on average, loans at Tier 1 deficient
BHCs shrank by 12.6 percent over the same
period.
I investigated the possibility that other factors
affected relative loan growth rates at Tier 2 defi-
cient and Tier 1 deficient BHCs. For example,
Tier 1 deficient BHCs may all have faced unu-
sually weak loan demand. Or, perhaps BHCs
avoided issuance ofany type of capital, and
Tier 1 deficient BHCs' reduced loan growth was
simply because they were more severely under-
capitalized. However, even after controlling for
loan demand and the size of the BHC's largest
capital deficiency (taking into account all three
types of capital ratios), the sharp difference in
loan growth rates remained. Also, the size of
the difference was found to be statistically
significant.
Conclusion
After the announcement ofthe new risk-based
capital requirements in 1989, bank loan growth
decreased for a period. Previous researchers have
found some evidence to link the two events, es-
sentially arguing that numerous banks and BHCs
anticipated being undercapitalized and raised
their capital-to-assets ratios by decreasing loan
growth.
What has been missing from this story is an ex-
planation of why banks should have avoided new
capital issuance. In this Weekly Letter, we have
seen that BHCs, as well as other types offirms,
appear to experience a drop in their stock prices
when they announce new issuances of common
stock. Such an effect may help to explain a pref-
erence for decreasing loan growth rather than
issuing new equity. BHCs with inadequate com-
mon shareholders' equity experienced a sharp
drop in loans between year-end 1990 and year-
end 1992. On the other hand, no negative stock
price effects seem to follow from announcing is-
suances of non-common stock regulatory capital.
And, indeed, capital deficient BHCs that were
not short on common shareholders' equity in par-
ticular experienced loan growth comparable to
that of BHCs that had no capital deficiency at all.
One interpretation of these results is that, had the
risk-based capital rules not included a require-
ment for a certain level of common shareholders'
equity, loan growth for the Tier 1 capital deficient
BHCs would have been considerably higher. But,
this does not necessarily mean that requirements
for common shareholders' equity should be re-
duced or eliminated. This type of capital argu-
ably provides the best protection to the deposit
insurance fund in case of bank failure. However,
it does mean that if we are concerned about the
flow of bank credit to the economy, we might
want to take these results into account in weigh-
ing the likely costs and benefits of the design
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